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Abstract 
We implement a method to estimate the direct effects of foreign-ownership on foreign firms' 
productivity and the indirect effects (or spillovers) from the presence of foreign-owned firms 
on other foreign and domestic firms' productivity in a unifying framework, taking interactions 
between firms into account. To do so, we relax a fundamental assumption made in empirical 
studies examining a direct causal effect of foreign ownership on firm productivity, namely 
that of no interactions between firms. Based on our approach, we are able to combine direct 
and indirect effects of foreign ownership and calculate the total effect of foreign firms on 
local productivity. Our results show that all these effects vary with the level of foreign 
presence within a cluster, an important finding for the academic literature and policy debate 
on the benefits of attracting foreign owned firms.  
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1. Introduction   
When considering the impact of inward foreign direct investment on host country 
productivity, researchers and policy makers generally think about two aspects.  The first is the 
direct effect of foreign ownership, boiling down to the question as to whether affiliates of 
foreign multinationals in a host country are more productive than comparable domestic firms.  
The second aspect is “spillovers”, i.e., whether there is any effect from the presence of foreign 
firms on the productivity of domestic or other foreign-owned firms.  These two questions 
have been pursued in, for the most part, two separate literatures.   
One research strand (e.g., Harris and Robinson, 2002, Girma and Görg, 2007a, Arnold and 
Javorcik, 2009) implements methods from microeconometric programme evaluation to 
estimate the direct treatment effects for firms receiving the “treatment” of being foreign 
compared to non-treated domestic firms (without considering “spillovers”).  This literature 
appeals to theoretical models of multinationals, either in the tradition of the knowledge capital 
model as in Markusen (2001), or the more recent models of heterogeneous firms (e.g., 
Helpman et al., 2004), which assume that foreign owned multinationals have firm specific 
assets which translate into a productivity advantage.  The second research strand (e.g., Aitken 
and Harrison, 1999, Haskel et al., 2007, Keller and Yeaple, 2009) looks at indirect effects 
through productivity “spillovers” (while largely neglecting direct treatment effects).  The 
theoretical intuition is that domestic firms can learn from the presence of foreign 
multinationals in their vicinity, e.g., because workers move from a foreign firm to a domestic 
competitor (e.g., Fosfuri et al., 2001).   
Examining direct effects and spillovers in isolation leads to potentially biased estimates 
and policy conclusions, however.  When evaluating the direct treatment effect of foreign 
ownership, the econometric approaches assume that the productivity of the control group is 
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independent of foreign ownership – an assumption in contrast with the idea of spillovers.1  In 
the “spillovers literature”, identification of the effects of foreign ownership at the industry 
level on domestic firm productivity is problematic because of endogeneity concerns – there 
are industry or region specific shocks that positively affect domestic firms’ productivity and 
raise the attractiveness of the location for foreign multinationals.   
In this paper, we bring the two strands of literature together and propose and implement a 
unified framework to estimate direct and indirect effects from foreign ownership on firm level 
productivity which allows for interaction between foreign and domestic, and foreign and 
foreign firms.  Our approach, detailed in the following sections, allows us to estimate 
consistently a number of different treatment effects.  In particular, we can distinguish the 
direct effect of foreign ownership on the treated firms and two types of indirect effects of the 
treatment, namely the indirect effects on treated and non-treated firms.  These indirect effects, 
thus, capture externalities or learning effects from foreign firms on other foreign (i.e., treated) 
or domestic firms (i.e., non-treated).  Furthermore, combining the direct and indirect effects 
we can calculate a total effect of foreign firms on local productivity.   
Distinguishing these effects is not only of academic merit but also highly policy relevant, 
as it allows us to provide much richer and sharper insights on the nexus between foreign 
ownership, proximity to foreign-owned firms, and firm productivity.  Hence, the approach 
suggested here provides a very useful tool for policymakers to understand better the benefits 
of encouraging foreign direct investment  
We implement our econometric framework using firm level data for Chinese 
manufacturing.  Following, Hudgens and Halloran (2008) our approach to take into account 
the role of interactions among firms when evaluating the effects of foreign ownership on 
firms’ productivity is to use the proportion of foreign firms within well-defined clusters at the 
                                                          
1
 This is known as the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA), which states that an individual 
outcome does not depend on the treatment status of others.   
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industry-region level. Thus, the potential outcomes depend not only on the firm’s treatment 
status, but also on the fraction of foreign firms in a particular cluster.   
Our empirical results show that the direct effect of the treatment on the treated firms is 
not homogenous across industry-region clusters, but rather differs strongly across such 
clusters. In particular, we find that the direct effect of foreign-ownership on the treated (i.e. 
foreign-owned) firms is positive and increases strongly with the overall level of foreign-
owned firms in a cluster.  This suggests that the standard approach of estimating direct 
treatment effects, which neglects interactions between firms, fails to uncover potentially 
important heterogeneity in the effect across clusters.    
On the other hand, we find a consistently negative indirect effect of foreign-ownership 
on non-treated firms, indicating negative “spillovers” from foreign presence on domestic 
firms.  Also, in contrast to much of the literature on spillovers cited above, our approach 
shows that the strength of this negative spillover is not constant but differs significantly with 
the level of foreign ownership in a cluster.  Spillovers are more negative with increasing 
presence of foreign firms up to a threshold of around 40 percent foreign-owned firms, after 
which they become less negative.   
In terms of the indirect impact of foreign ownership on the treated (i.e. the spillovers 
from the presence of foreign firms on other foreign firms in the same cluster), we also find a 
negative effect up to a level of 40 percent foreign-owned firms in a cluster. However, after 
reaching this threshold these effects turn positive. This has important implications for 
arguments favouring the agglomeration of foreign-owned firms in a cluster, as this shows that 
the benefits from such agglomerations might only become positive once a certain threshold is 
reached.   
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 presents the theoretical 
motivation of the paper. Section 3 discusses our identification strategy and introduces the 
different types of effects we aim to estimate.  Section 4 presents the data set that we use to 
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illustrate our arguments, while Section 5 gives a detailed explanation of the estimation of the 
average potential outcomes, key ingredients in the identification of causal effects. Section 6 
discusses the main findings of the paper, and Section 7 concludes.   
 
2. Theoretical motivation 
In this section we sketch out a simple theoretical framework in order to motivate the 
empirical analysis.  The model is closely related to Guadalupe et al. (2012) (GKT), who look 
at the impact of foreign investment on firms’ innovation activities in a model of firm 
heterogeneity.  They, however, only look at a direct causal effect of foreign acquisition, 
implicitly assuming no spillover effects. To capture such spillovers, our theoretical sketch 
essentially re-interprets their model for a case in which firms’ productivity enhancing 
activities also depend on the presence of other foreign firms in a cluster and the capacity of 
foreign and domestic firms to absorb spillovers from FDI.   
As in GKT we work with a model with heterogeneous firms in a monopolistic 
competition setting and a CES demand function.  Firm i has an initial productivity level of  
𝑖
 
and it can make a productivity enhancing investment, 
𝑖
. In GKT this investment is 
considered to be innovation.  We take a broader view and consider this to be any activity that 
is productivity-increasing at the firm level, and that will lead to a measurable increase in 
productivity as a result of firm level foreign investment.   
Firm's i profits are given by  
πi = B𝑖𝜏i𝜙i                                                                                 (1)  
where B𝑖 = A𝑖 (
1−𝜌
𝜌
) 𝜌𝜎 with A being market size and ρ defining the elasticity of substitution 
between varieties σ = 1 / (1- ρ).2 For ease of exposition we define  𝜏i = (𝛾𝑖)
𝜎−1 and 𝜙i =
                                                          
2
 Guadalupe et al. (2012) allow the parameter A to vary across foreign and domestic firms.  Their idea is that 
foreign firms may have access to larger markets than domestic firms.  We simplify this model and abstract from 
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
i
σ−1 which are transformed measures of productivity-enhancing investments and initial 
productivity, respectively.   Firms must engage in costly investments in order to increase 
their productivity level. As in GKT we assume that the cost of such investments (𝐶𝑖) include a 
fixed and a variable component, as follows: 
𝐶𝑖 = 𝑎𝑖 +
𝑏𝑖
𝛼𝑖𝑁𝑟
𝑓(𝜏𝑖)                                                                    (2) 
with f denoting a general positive function of 𝜏𝑖 without specific assumptions about its 
functional form.   
In GKT, foreign ownership impacts innovation only by affecting the parameters 𝑎𝑖 
and 𝑏𝑖. We follow their approach and assume that these parameters are positive and lower for 
foreign (F) than for domestic firms (D): 0 ≤ 𝑏𝐹 < 𝑏𝐷 and 0 ≤ 𝑎𝐹 < 𝑎𝐷. This reflects the 
foreign multinational’s access to better technology, or lower costs of financing, which imply 
that the firm has lower costs for implementing productivity enhancing investments. We 
interpret this as the direct effect of foreign ownership on firms’ productivity, which we 
attempt to identify in our empirical analysis.   
To capture the indirect effects from other foreign firms, we extend GKT by allowing 
the variable cost of productivity enhancing investment also to depend on: i) the number of 
foreign firms in a cluster (Nr), and ii) a firm specific constant, capturing its capacity to absorb 
spillovers from foreign firms (αi). The assumption that the cost of productivity enhancing 
technologies depends on the number of foreign firms (Nr) captures the notion of spillovers.  
These are generally expected to be positive due to learning effects.  While we do not model 
the exact underlying mechanism (which we also cannot measure in our data), one reasonable 
interpretation for such positive effects is worker movements.  As discussed by Fosfuri et al. 
(2001), domestic workers may be hired by foreign firms (which possess superior technology) 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
this market size effect in order to be able to focus on the effect we find more relevant, namely, the effects of 
foreign ownership on the cost of productivity enhancing investments.   
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and then trained to be able to use the up-to-date technology.
3
  After a period of training, they 
may then either remain in the foreign-owned firm or move to a domestic competitor.  In the 
latter case, they take with them some knowledge about technology, which then makes it easier 
for the domestic firm to implement this new technology.  A domestic firm without a foreign-
trained worker is not able to do so.  Hence, the costs of improving technology are, in this case, 
lower for the domestic firm with foreign-trained worker than for the domestic firm without.  
We assume that the chance of being able to employ such a foreign-trained worker is 
increasing in the number of foreign-owned firms.
4
  
However, the empirical literature shows that spillovers may also be negative, see for 
example Aitken and Harrison (1999).  This is generally attributed to competition effects.  
Multinationals have lower marginal costs due to some firm-specific advantage, which allows 
them to attract demand away from domestic firms, thus forcing the domestic firms to reduce 
production and move up their (given) average cost curve.  This leads to lower productivity.  
Whether the spillover effect is positive or negative is, hence, an empirical issue.   
The second innovation in our model is the inclusion of the firm specific term, αi, 
which measures the strength with which spillovers affect firm i.  This captures the idea that 
spillover effects may not be uniform across firms but may differ depending on some firm 
specific characteristic.  Görg and Greenaway (2004), for example, argue that whether a firm 
benefits from spillovers may depend on its relative backwardness and its capacity for 
assimilating knowledge.  In particular, foreign firms with access to superior technology are 
likely to benefit more from the presence of other foreign firms in the cluster. To capture the 
notion of heterogeneity in the spillover effects we allow the parameter αi to be different for 
domestic and foreign firms. In particular we assume 𝛼𝐹 > 𝛼𝐷, indicating the superiority of 
                                                          
3
 Görg and Strobl (2005) provide empirical evidence from firm level data for Ghana.   
4
 There may also be other channels for spillovers from multinationals to domestic firms, such as learning 
externalities or vertical linkages.  See Keller (2010) for a discussion.   
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foreign firms to absorb positive foreign spillovers. We can identify these two different 
indirect effects on foreign and domestic firms in our empirical work.  
Given the operating profits and the cost of improvements in productivity, the value of 
a firm i is given by  
𝑉𝑖 = B𝑖𝜏i𝜙i −  𝑎𝑖 −
𝑏𝑖
𝛼𝑖𝑁𝑟
𝑓(𝜏𝑖)                                                        (3) 
 
To determine the level of investment in productivity enhancing technology that 
maximizes the value of the firm we set the first derivative (dVi / d𝜏𝑖) equal to zero and obtain 
 
𝛼𝑖𝑁𝑟B𝑖𝜙i =  𝑏𝑖𝑓′(𝜏𝑖
∗)                                                          (4) 
 
Equation 4 implies that productivity enhancing investment is higher (i) the lower is 𝑏𝑖, (ii) 
the higher is the spillover effect from the number of foreign firms (𝛼𝑖𝑁𝑟) and (iii) the higher 
is initial productivity 𝜙i.  In other words, as in GKT, there is a direct effect of foreign 
ownership on productivity enhancing investment as foreign firms have lower 𝑏𝑖.  Moreover, 
expanding on GKT, there is also an indirect effect through the number of foreign firms in the 
cluster (𝑁𝑟) and this indirect effect is different for foreign and domestic firms (which have 
different 𝛼𝑖).  Finally, the First Order Condition (FOC) given by equation 4 also suggests that 
initial productivity plays a role for firms’ investments in productivity enhancing technology.   
An important insight from equation (4) is that the FOC does not separately identify 𝛼𝑖𝑁𝑟 
or 𝑏𝑖 but only the ratio 𝛼𝑖𝑁𝑟/𝑏𝑖.  Not taking into account the impact of 𝛼𝑖𝑁𝑟 in an empirical 
estimation of the direct effect of foreign ownership (due to 𝑏𝑖) would imply that the estimated 
direct effect might be biased.  Depending on the specific assumption about the expected effect 
of αiNr it would be either over- or underestimated.  In our empirical framework, we can 
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separate these effects and obtain an unbiased estimate of the direct causal effect due to 𝑏𝑖 and 
also estimate the indirect effects of foreign ownership on foreign and domestic firms.   
We can also say something about the acquisition decision, which is unlikely to be 
random.  In order to see whether an acquisition is profitable, we can compare the value of a 
firm (given in equation 3) under foreign and domestic ownership.  Specifically, given the 
different characteristics of firms according to their ownership structure, the difference in 
value, at the optimal level of investment in new technology τi
∗, between a foreign and 
domestic firm is given by 
𝑉𝑖
𝐹∗ − 𝑉𝑖
𝐷∗ = (𝜏𝑖
𝐹∗ − 𝜏𝑖
𝐷∗)B𝑖𝜙i − (𝑎𝐹 − 𝑎𝐷) − (
𝑏𝐹
𝛼𝐹𝑁𝑟
𝑓(𝜏𝑖
𝐹∗) −
𝑏𝐷
𝛼𝐷𝑁𝑟
𝑓(𝜏𝑖
𝐷∗))            (5) 
 
Differentiating this with respect to 𝜙i yields a positive expression, indicating that the 
difference in value is increasing in initial productivity. 
 
𝑑(𝑉𝑖
𝐹∗ − 𝑉𝑖
𝐷∗)
𝑑𝜙i
⁄ = (𝜏𝑖
𝐹∗ − 𝜏𝑖
𝐷∗)B𝑖                                                 (6) 
 
Hence, the value enhancing benefits from foreign acquisitions are more pronounced 
for firms with high initial productivity, or, in other words, foreign acquired targets in the host 
country are likely to be more productive prior to acquisition.  This result arises from the 
assumption that any investment in productivity is more valuable under foreign control.  For 
our empirical implementation this implies that we need to control for initial productivity when 
attempting to identify the direct effect of foreign ownership, which we do in a propensity 
score framework.   
In our set up we can also look at how the acquisition incentives change with the 
number of existing foreign firms in the cluster (Nr).  The sign of the partial derivative 
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𝑑(𝑉𝑖
𝐹∗ − 𝑉𝑖
𝐷∗)
𝑑𝑁𝑟
⁄ =
𝑏𝐹
𝛼𝐹𝑁𝑟
2 𝑓(𝜏𝑖
𝐹∗) +
𝑏𝐷
𝛼𝐷𝑁𝑟
2 𝑓(𝜏𝑖
𝐷∗)                        (7) 
 
depends on the sign of the parameters 𝛼𝐹 and 𝛼𝐷. For example, in the case where αF > αD >
0 (that is, assuming that foreign firms have relatively higher absorptive capacity) expression 7 
is unambiguously positive, indicating that the incremental value of the firm under foreign 
ownership is increasing in the number of foreign firms in the cluster. Thus, acquisition is 
more likely in clusters with a high presence of foreign firms.  We control for this also in our 
empirical estimation.   
 To sum up, our theoretical discussion provides a basis for expecting a positive direct 
effect of foreign ownership on productivity enhancing investments in a firm.  There are also 
potentially different indirect effects of foreign ownership on foreign and domestic firms, and 
these need to be taken into account in order to obtain an unbiased estimate of the direct effect.  
Furthermore, the acquisition decision is not random, but may be related to firms’ initial 
productivity and the number of foreign firms in a cluster.  We now turn to the empirical 
analysis. 
 
3. Identification strategy  
The estimation of direct and indirect effects of foreign ownership on productivity is 
rendered difficult because of an important assumption in the commonly used micro-
econometric approaches for estimating direct effects – the Stable Unit Treatment Value 
Assumption (SUTVA).  This assumption essentially states that an individual outcome does 
not depend on the treatment status of others.  Or, in other words, there are no indirect effects 
(or spillovers) from all treated individuals on the outcome for an individual.  Translated into 
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the specifics of the FDI and productivity debate, the assumption implies that the average 
productivity of a firm (foreign or domestic) is not influenced by the presence of other treated 
(i.e., foreign-owned) firms.  This assumption is, thus, in direct contrast to the notion of 
“productivity spillovers”.  This implies that it is likely that SUTVA is violated in studies 
looking at productivity differences between foreign and domestic firms using standard micro-
econometric evaluation techniques.  
Our approach to estimating consistently direct and indirect effects of foreign ownership is 
based on recent work in the statistical and econometric literature that has sought to relax 
SUTVA.
5
  According to this literature, treatment externalities (or spillovers) occur when an 
individual’s potential outcome is affected by other individuals’ treatment status within a 
group.  The approach we take, following Hudgens and Halloran (2008), is to use the 
proportion of treated firms within a group as a measure of interaction between individual 
firms.
6
 The potential outcomes are thus expressed as a function of the firm’s treatment status 
and the fraction of foreign firms in a particular group or cluster.  
Suppose we have r=1…R sufficiently heterogeneous economic clusters, which for the 
purpose of this application we define in terms of broad industry groups and geographical 
areas as industry-region clusters.  A key identifying assumption is the so-called partial 
interference assumption where SUTVA holds across clusters but not within clusters. In other 
words, we only allow interactions between firms in the same industry and geographic area. 
We use this definition of clusters as it is in line with the finding in much of the empirical 
                                                          
5
 Seminal theoretical papers on “causal inference with interactions” include Sobel (2006); Rosenbaum (2007); 
Hudgens and Halloran (2008) and Manski (2013).  Building on these works Ferracci et al. (2014) provide a 
comprehensive study of the impacts of training programmes on unemployment duration in the presence of 
interactions in the local labour markets.  Angelucci and de Giorgi (2009) employ village-level randomisation to 
assess the indirect impact of cash transfer program in Mexico. 
6
 The most general (extreme) case of interactions are “unrestricted interactions” between all individuals within a 
group, in which case potential outcomes are not only functions of the individual’s treatment status, but also of all 
possible combinations of treatments. With unrestricted interactions, calculating the number of potential 
outcomes might become impracticable if the population size is large.  Hence, in order to be able to implement 
this approach, we follow Hudgens and Halloran (2008) and place some restrictions on the possible interactions.   
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work that “spillovers” from FDI appear strongest if they happen in the same broad industry 
and region (e.g., Girma and Wakelin, 2007, Xu and Sheng, 2012).
7
  Also, this definition 
(instead of using clusters based solely on, say, industry classification, or regions) provides us 
with a sufficiently large number of clusters.   
For ease of exposition we assume that there are i=1…N firms in each cluster and 𝑁𝑟 of 
these receive the treatment, i.e., in our case, have some amount of foreign ownership.  Hence, 
the proportion of treated firms is 𝑝𝑟 =
𝑁𝑟
𝑁
 ,  𝑟 = 1,  … , 𝑅.   Restricting ourselves to a binary 
treatment variable (𝑑𝑖𝑟=1 if firm i in cluster r has foreign ownership and 𝑑𝑖𝑟=0 if not), we 
have 𝑝𝑟 =
𝑁𝑟
𝑁
=
∑ 𝑑𝑖𝑟
𝑁
𝑖
𝑁
.   
Letting y be the outcome variable (i.e. firm productivity) there are two potential outcomes, 
 𝑦0 and 𝑦1, corresponding to the two treatment states.  Only one of those can be observed for 
any one firm.  If SUTVA holds within clusters, an individual’s potential outcomes are only a 
function of its own treatment status: 
                                    𝐸(𝑦𝑖𝑟|𝑑𝑖𝑟) ≡ 𝑦𝑖𝑟
𝑑 = 𝑦𝑖𝑟
𝑑 (𝑑𝑖𝑟); d=0, 1.                                                  (8) 
If SUTVA does not hold, one can think of the extreme case of unrestricted interactions 
between all individuals within a cluster, in which case potential outcomes are not only 
functions of the individual’s treatment status, but also of all 2𝑁 combinations of treatments, 
say 𝑑𝑖𝑟
− :   𝑦𝑖𝑟
𝑑 = 𝑦𝑖𝑟
𝑑 (𝑑𝑖𝑟 , 𝑑𝑖𝑟
− ) ; d=0,1. Following Hudgens and Halloran (2008), it makes 
practical sense to think in terms of the distribution of the treatment variable within a cluster, 
rather than of all possible treatment combinations.  
                                                          
7
 Note that we do not see this definition as excluding spillovers from vertical linkages, as highlighted by Javorcik 
(2004), as our industrial classification (see Appendix A) is sufficiently broad to also include vertical links.  
Moreover, our approach may be seen as offering a new alternative way of estimating intra-cluster spillovers.   
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A natural starting point is to consider the proportion of treated firms in the cluster, 
𝑝𝑟 =
𝑁𝑟
𝑁
 .  The potential outcomes under the two treatment states can then be expressed as a 
function of the individual’s treatment status and 𝑝𝑟: 
                              𝑦𝑖𝑟
𝑑  ≡ 𝑦𝑖𝑟
𝑑 (𝑝𝑟) ; d=0, 1 and 𝑝𝑟 ∈ [0,1].                                          (9) 
Now we define the average (across independent clusters) potential outcomes corresponding to 
the two treatment states as a function of the proportion of treated individuals (i.e. share of 
firms with foreign ownership in a cluster) as follows: 
  ?̅?𝑝
𝑑 = 𝐸𝑟 [ ?̅?𝑟
𝑑
( 𝑝𝑟)] ; d=0, 1 and 𝑝𝑟 ∈ [0,1]                                   (10) 
If  
𝜕  ?̅?𝑝
𝑑
𝜕𝑝
≠ 0  for any d, then SUTVA would not be supported by the data.  This is intuitive as 
an individual’s potential outcomes should be independent of other individuals’ treatment 
status for the assumption of no treatment externalities to hold in the data. 
  Once the average potential outcomes   ?̅?𝑝
𝑑 are constructed for d=0, 1 and all possible 
relevant values 𝑝𝑟 ∈ [0,1], various treatment effect parameters can be defined and estimated. 
Like all causal effect estimators, these are defined as differences between two average 
potential outcomes. As discussed by Hudgens and Halloran (2008), four causal treatment 
effect parameters may be of particular interest: 
i. The direct causal effect of the treatment (Equation 11), which compares average potential 
outcomes for a firm with foreign ownership with the potential outcome for that firm without 
FDI, keeping the cluster-specific treatment level constant at p (i.e. keeping possible 
interactions fixed).  
 ?̅?
𝑝𝑝 
10 = ?̅?𝑝
1 − ?̅?𝑝
0                                                                  (11) 
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ii. The indirect effect on the non-treated (Equation 12), which in this literature is generally 
referred to as an FDI “spillover” on domestic firms. This estimator is defined as the change in 
the potential outcome of non-foreign-owned firms resulting from increasing the cluster-
specific proportion of foreign firms from 0 to p.    
  ?̅?
𝑝0 
00 = ?̅?𝑝
0 − ?̅?0
0                                                                (12) 
iii. The total treatment effect (Equation 13), which captures the change in the potential 
outcome of foreign firms when the proportion of foreign firms in the cluster is p > 0 
compared to the no-treatment outcome that would occur if p = 0 (i.e., no foreign firms in the 
cluster).   
?̅?
𝑝0 
10 = ?̅?𝑝
1 − ?̅?0
0                                                           (13) 
As shown by Hudgens and Halloran (2008), the total treatment effect can be decomposed into 
direct and indirect effects, that is   ?̅?
𝑝0 
10 =  ?̅?
𝑝𝑝 
10 +  ?̅?
𝑝0 
00  . 
iv. The marginal treatment effect on the treated - or indirect effect on the treated- (Equation 
14), which measures the marginal change in the potential outcome for foreign-owned firms 
when the proportion of foreign firms goes from 0 to p (Hudgens and Halloran (2008).  In 
other words, this captures a “spillover” of FDI activity on foreign-owned firms themselves.   
?̅?
𝑝0 
11 = ?̅?𝑝
1 − ?̅?0
1                                                               (14)   
Next we turn to the discussion of the data used in our empirical analysis.
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4. Data description  
                                                          
8
 It is worth noting that the benchmark treatment level in equations (11)-(14) need not be 0:  comparisons can be 
made between any two treatment levels. For example, if interest lies in estimating the indirect effects of 
increasing the proportion of FDI firms from 20% to 30% we would compute  ?̅?
0.30,0.20 
00 = ?̅?0.30
0 − ?̅?0.20
0    .   
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We implement the empirical analysis using firm level data from the Chinese 
manufacturing industry.  The dataset is based on the Annual Reports of Industrial Enterprise 
Statistics, compiled by the China National Bureau of Statistics. The dataset covers all firms in 
China with an annual turnover of more than 5 million Renminbi (about $800,000). These 
companies account for an estimated 85–90 percent of total output in most industries.  For the 
purpose of this analysis, we have more than 147,000 firms over the period 2004-2006. Our 
“treatment” is defined as a firm having foreign investment in 2005.9   
Table 1 gives some summary statistics of variables of interest by foreign ownership status. 
These include pre-treatment (i.e. in 2004) firm characteristics and the pre and post treatment 
(2004 and 2006) of the outcome variable, which is the log of labour productivity defined as 
value added per worker.
10
 As one might expect, there are substantial differences between 
domestic and foreign firms vindicating the adoption of a treatment effects evaluation 
framework. The raw data suggest that on average foreign and domestic firms recorded 
approximately a 30% and 15% cumulative growth in productivity respectively between 2004 
and 2006. Using a relatively naïve difference-in-differences estimator, one would have 
concluded that the causal effect of foreign ownership is to the tune of 15%.  
As discussed in the previous section, our identification strategy invokes the partial 
interference assumption where firm interaction is freely allowed within well-defined clusters.  
In this paper we classify firms into clusters based on 11 geographic areas and 13 broadly 
defined industries.
11
  This gives us 127 clusters, half of which comprise of at least 768 
                                                          
9
  A firm is deemed to have foreign ownership if foreign investment accounts for at least 10% of firms’ paid-up 
capital. 
10
 Value added per worker is deflated by the consumer price index.  Since our main objective is to suggest a 
framework for estimating the direct and indirect effects of FDI in a unified way, we want to abstract from the 
various well-documented econometric issues plaguing the estimation of TFP, and concentrate rather on value 
added per worker (which in any case is found to be highly correlated with TFP in most countries’ micro data).  
However, below we also provide a robustness check and report results based on TFP estimated following 
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). 
11
 See Appendix A for a list of geographic areas and industries.   
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firms.
12
 Table 2 reports some summary statistics of cluster level variables. The average 
proportion of firms with foreign ownership in a cluster is about 21 percent. It is also apparent 
from the various measures of dispersion given in Table 2 that clusters are quite heterogeneous 
in terms of average characteristics.  Table 3 reports the number of foreign firms and 
proportion of foreign (treated) firms by cluster. As can be seen, there is substantial 
heterogeneity across clusters.  Furthermore, Table 4 shows that the proportion of foreign 
firms in a cluster exhibits significant correlation with average cluster-specific characteristics.  
The next section discusses the econometric implementation of the approach outlined in 
Section 3, which proceeds in two steps.   
5. Empirical implementation 
5.1 Estimation of potential outcomes 
In the first step we focus on the estimation of potential or counterfactual outcomes 
(equation 10) as this is a key ingredient for estimating treatment effect parameters (equations 
11 – 14) which are defined as differences between average potential outcomes. Accordingly, 
for each of the 127 clusters, we estimate the average potential outcomes ?̅?𝑟
1 and ?̅?𝑟
0 under FDI 
and no FDI scenarios respectively [see equation (10)], where y denotes the outcome variable, 
labour productivity.  
In order to deal with selection and unobserved heterogeneity in this estimation we apply 
the conditional independence assumption (CIA) as in the propensity-score matching literature 
(Rubin, 1974).  This involves estimating the propensity of a firm receiving treatment (i.e., 
being foreign owned) by conditioning the treatment dummy variable (which is equal to one if 
a firm has foreign ownership and zero else) on a vector of the following pre-treatment firm 
characteristics: wages (level and growth), productivity (level and growth), size (log of total 
                                                          
12
 We impose the condition that at least 4% of firms in a cluster should be foreign-invested and the total number 
of firms should not be less than 100. For this reason we have to leave out 17 clusters from the analysis. 
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assets), age, export intensity, and motivated by the theoretical discussion in Section 2, the 
number of foreign firms in the firm’s region. To account for firm-level unobserved 
heterogeneity, we combine CIA with difference-in-differences (cf., Girma and Görg, 2007b) 
by considering the change in the outcome variables between post (2006) and pre-treatment 
(2004) periods.  However, for ease of exposition, we maintain the y notation for the outcome 
variables.  
In the empirical implementation we identify the expected individual outcomes per cluster 
by estimating the outcome equation using inverse propensity-score weighted regression also 
controlling for the pre-treatment covariates (Hirano, Imbens and Ridder, 2003).
13
 For each 
cluster, this involves: 
a. Generating the propensity-score (ρ) of being treated via a logistic regression with X as 
covariates.
14
  
b. Estimating the following outcome equation (after imposing the common support 
condition) via inverse probability weighted regression, with treated firms getting 
weight of 1/ ρ and non-treated firms getting weight of 1/1- ρ, 
 
       𝑦𝑖𝑟 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑑𝑖𝑟 + 𝛿𝑋 + 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟; i=1…N.                                  (15) 
 
c. Finally computing the cluster specific potential outcomes based on the estimated 
regressions  as
15
 
                                                          
13
 Before implementing this approach, we carry out a standard propensity score matching combined with 
difference in differences analysis for comparison.  This standard PSM, of course, relies on SUTVA.  Applying 
this technique we find that foreign ownership has a positive causal effect on productivity with a magnitude of 
around 15 percent.  The PSM estimation is based on nearest neighbour matching as applied in Girma and Görg 
(2007b), with successful balancing tests and imposing common support.  Details are not provided here to save 
space, but can be obtained from the authors upon request.   
14
 See Appendix B for a summary of the estimated coefficients from the cluster-specific logit model. Covariate 
balancing tests, which consist of testing for difference (at 10% level or lower) between the average values of the 
covariates in treatment and control groups, conditional on the propensity score, are given in the last column of 
the table in Appendix B. 
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 ?̅?𝑟
1 =  
1
𝑁
∑ ?̂?𝑁𝑖=1 + ?̂? + 𝛿𝑋  𝑎𝑛𝑑    ?̅?𝑟
0 =  
1
𝑁
∑ ?̂?𝑁𝑖=1 + ?̂?X               (16) 
 
 
 
 
5.2 Calculating treatment effects 
In the second step, we use the estimated cluster-specific potential outcomes to 
estimate the direct and indirect effects of FDI on firms' productivity in the presence of 
interaction between firms.  To this end, we use the proportion of foreign firms in the cluster as 
a measure of firms' interactions. Hence, we treat the cluster level average potential outcomes 
under foreign ownership and no foreign ownership, ?̅?𝑟
1 and ?̅?𝑟
0, (estimated in the first step) as 
our "outcome" variables and the proportion of foreign firms in each cluster as our 
(continuous) "treatment" variable.  In other words, once the average potential outcomes  ?̅?𝑝
𝑑 
are constructed for d=0, 1 and all relevant values 𝑝 the various treatment effect parameters 
can be estimated. We do this using a causal inference approach for continuous treatments. 
This step involves working with cluster level variables and conditioning on the general 
propensity score for the proportion of foreign firms in a cluster (see Appendix C for details). 
5.3 Does SUTVA hold? 
Before commencing with this estimation we briefly consider the validity of SUTVA in our 
data.  We do so by firstly checking whether there is a correlation between these cluster-
specific ATEs estimated using equations 15 and 16 and the observed proportion of foreign 
owned firms in the cluster.  Figure 1 presents a scatter plot as well as a regression line from a 
nonparametric regression of the ATE on the proportion of treated firms in the cluster.  Taken 
at face value, this indicates fairly heterogeneous behaviour across treatment clusters, 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
15
 Note that under SUTVA, the difference between these two potential outcomes (?̂?) would give a consistent 
estimator of the average treatment effect (ATE) in each cluster. 
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suggesting that SUTVA is unlikely to be satisfied by the data (i.e., a firm’s potential outcome 
is not independent of the treatment level per cluster).  
However, as shown in Table 4, clusters also differ along a line of other characteristics. 
Hence, to further test the validity of SUTVA, we investigate more formally the existence of a 
causal link between potential outcomes and the proportion of foreign firms in a cluster using a 
generalised propensity score (GPS) technique. Our results, presented in Figure C1 (appendix 
C), show that the potential outcomes (for treated and untreated firms) vary systematically with 
the treatment level in the cluster, suggesting that SUTVA does not hold. 
Hence, the standard PSM approach masks substantial cross cluster heterogeneity, as is 
obvious from Figures 1 and C1.  Our novel approach, as explained in the previous sections, 
arguably provides a more appropriate way of estimating the causal effect of foreign ownership 
on productivity.  In the next Section we, therefore, turn to calculating the direct, indirect, total 
and marginal treatment productivity effects (defined in Section 3) by varying the proportion 
of treated firms in a cluster.
16
 
 
6. Treatment effects with interactions: main findings  
For ease of presentation, we plot the estimated effects along with their 95% 
confidence intervals. It is apparent from Figure 2 that the proportion of foreign-owned firms 
in a cluster matters significantly, both statistically and economically. 
Our first finding is that the direct average treatment effects, i.e., the productivity 
premium due to having foreign ownership differs strongly as one varies the proportion of 
foreign firms in the cluster.  While they are positive irrespective of the proportion of foreign 
firms in the cluster, it is apparent from Figure 2 that the share of foreign firms matters 
significantly for any conclusion one can draw from the data.  This is in line with our 
                                                          
16
 We outline the main reasons why a simple linear model where the direct and indirect effects of FDI are 
estimated within a single framework is unlikely to be an adequate empirical tool in Appendix D.  
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motivating discussion in Section 2, where we argue that foreign owned firms have higher 
investments in productivity enhancing activities and that such investments may be higher (in 
the presence of positive spillovers) the more prevalent are foreign firms in the cluster  
We can see, for example, that the direct effect is smaller for a cluster with a 10 percent 
share of foreign owned firms than for a cluster with insignificant foreign presence.  After the 
10 percent mark we see strong increases in the direct effect with increasing proportions of 
foreign-owned firms.  For example, the direct productivity effects of foreign ownership would 
be 20% and 35% when the proportions of foreign firms in the cluster are 20% and 50% 
respectively.   
In contrast, we uncover significant negative indirect effects on non-treated (i.e. 
domestic owned) firms. In the context of the literature on FDI, we can interpret this as 
evidence for negative productivity spill overs. This is not unusual in the literature on 
spillovers, which in many cases finds negative effects of the presence of FDI on productivity 
of domestic firms (see Görg and Greenaway, 2004) and is generally regarded as indicating 
negative competition or market-stealing effects from multinationals.  Interestingly, we 
document evidence that this effect varies with the proportion of foreign owned firms; it seems 
to be most negative around the 40% mark.  This is a novel finding, as the literature generally 
only estimates a constant spillover effect that does not vary with the level of the proportion of 
foreign owned firms.   
From the combination of direct and indirect effect we can calculate the total effect of 
the treatment.  Note that, while these total effects on productivity are uniformly positive, they 
do not increase monotonically with the share of foreign owned firms.  Rather, we find that the 
total effect declines when the proportion of foreign owned firms in a cluster moves from 0 to 
about 20.  This is due to the negative indirect effects which outweigh the direct effects.  Only 
after reaching this 20 percent threshold do we see further increases in the total effect with 
increasing shares of foreign firms in the cluster.  Still, we find that even though we have 
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strong evidence for negative spillovers (indirect effect), the total effect of the treatment (i.e., 
foreign ownership) is generally positive.   
The non-monotonic relationship between the proportion of foreign firms in a cluster 
and the total treatment effect is further illustrated when one studies the marginal average 
treatment effects on the treated.  Recall that this gives the marginal change in the potential 
outcome for treated firms when the proportion of treated firms changes from 0 to p.  These 
marginal effects become increasingly negative up to a threshold of 20 percent.  They only 
start turning positive after the 40% mark.  Hence, this result indicates that low proportions of 
foreign ownership in a cluster are not optimal from the perspective of treated (i.e., foreign 
owned) firms.  Instead, it seems to be the case that a “critical mass” of foreign owned firms in 
a cluster (with the critical mass point being in the region of 40%) is necessary in order to 
stimulate productivity in foreign owned firms.  This evidence thus suggests that foreign firms 
thrive in clusters with a high presence of other foreign firms.  This is in line with arguments 
by Lee et al. (2013), Chen (2009) and Henderson (2003) who find that agglomerations of 
firms (in particular foreign owned) can be important for firm level productivity and 
development.  Our evidence, however, shows that this is not necessarily a monotonically 
positive relationship, but that the positive effects only kick in after reaching a certain level of 
foreign presence in a cluster.   
As our results thus far rely on labour productivity as outcome variable, we now 
provide a robustness check where we measure total factor productivity (TFP) using the 
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) methodology.  The results are presented in Figure 3.  Note that 
the patterns of results look very similar to the patterns observed using labour productivity.  
The main difference is that the effects based on TFP have turning points at lower percentage 
shares of foreign firms.  For example, we can see that the marginal treatment effects start to 
pick up at around 10 per cent of foreign owned firms in a cluster and become positive after 
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reaching about 30 percent when using TFP.  When using labour productivity, they only 
become positive after reaching around 40 percent of foreign owned firms in a cluster.   
 
7. Conclusions 
This paper offers a causal analysis of the direct and indirect effects of foreign 
ownership on firm level productivity of treated (i.e., foreign) and non-treated (i.e., domestic) 
firms.  The approach we follow in this paper enables us to estimate, in a unified framework, 
the direct effect of foreign-ownership on the productivity of foreign firms, as well as two 
types of indirect effects, namely on domestic and foreign firms.  These latter two effects 
provide estimates of “spillovers” from the presence of foreign-owned firms on foreign and 
domestic firms.  Combining direct and indirect effects we can also calculate a total effect of 
foreign firms.  Our approach thus allows us to distinguish between different types of 
treatment effects, which are not only academically interesting but also highly policy relevant.   
Importantly, we provide empirical evidence that not only the direct effects vary 
systematically with the proportion of foreign firms in the cluster, but also the spillover effects 
differ strongly across such clusters.  Specifically, the analysis shows that for our Chinese data 
spillovers on domestic firms become more negative with increasing presence of foreign-
invested firms up to a threshold of around 40 percent foreign ownership in a cluster.  After 
this threshold they become less negative.   
For spillovers on other foreign firms we find that these are negative up to a threshold 
of 40 percent foreign ownership in a cluster.  After this value they turn positive, however.  
This latter result provides an important finding for the academic literature and policy debate 
on the benefits from “agglomerations” of foreign owned firms, showing that these benefits are 
not uniform but depend strongly on the level of foreign ownership in a well-defined cluster.   
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Combining our treatment effects we find a total effect that is positive but initially 
declines with low shares of foreign firms in a cluster.  However, after reaching about 20 
percent of foreign firms the total effect increases with increasing shares of foreign firms in the 
cluster.  Hence, for policymakers, this might suggest that they might aim to encourage 
concentrations of foreign firms above these thresholds in a cluster. 
Overall, our research suggests that estimating the various treatment effects described 
in this paper is a rewarding exercise as it sheds much needed light on the various mechanisms 
through which the proportion of foreign firms affects potential outcomes of foreign and non-
foreign firms. In so doing, our paper provides important inputs into the policy debate on the 
benefits from inward foreign direct investment for host country firms.    
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Figure 3 
 
Note: productivity measured as total factor productivity 
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Table 1 
Summary statistics of some firm level variables of interest  
 Mean Standard  
deviation 
Min Max 
Domestic firms     
Log productivity (2004) 3.993 1.284 -6.050 11.374 
Log productivity (2006) 4.149 1.080 -4.901 9.600 
Log wages (2004) 2.418 0.505 -3.135 8.440 
Exporting intensity (2004) 0.118 0.288 0.000 1.000 
Size (log of assets, 2004) 8.183 1.661 -0.026 17.666 
Log of age (2004) 1.970 0.936 0.000 4.605 
Log of number of  
foreign firms in region (2004)  
7.678 1.494 2.485 9.357 
Number of firms 133,010    
Foreign firms     
Log productivity (2004) 4.055 1.345 -4.723 11.613 
Log productivity (2006) 4.343 1.268 -3.724 11.875 
Log wages (2004) 2.737 0.612 -0.665 7.140 
Exporting intensity 2004) 0.452 0.438 0.000 1.000 
Size (log of assets, 2004) 8.939 1.724 -0.026 16.685 
Log of age (2004) 1.842 0.727 0.000 4.554 
Log of number of  
foreign firms in region (2004)  
8.360 1.073 2.485 9.357 
Number of firms 42085    
 
 
 
Table 2 
Summary statistics of some cluster level variables   
 Mean Standard  
deviation  
Min Max Inter-quartile 
range 
Proportion of  
FDI firms (2005) 
0.208 0.119 0.043 0.553 0.172 
Average wage (thousand RMB) (2004) 7.183 0.323 6.390 8.179 0.465 
Average productivity (2004) 4.269 0.372 3.380 5.418 0.470 
Average export intensity (2004) 0.235 0.127 0.029 0.610 0.168 
Share of SOEs (2004) 0.093 0.062 0.006 0.247 0.096 
Average size (log of  assets , 2004) 8.520 0.439 7.788 10.041 0.450 
Average age (2004) 2.006 0.175 1.218 2.510 0.191 
Average log number 
of FDI firms  (2004) 
5.077 1.209 2.303 8.148 1.648 
Number of clusters 127     
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Table 3 
Number of foreign firms and proportion of foreign (treated) firms by cluster   
Cluster NF PF Cluster NF PF Cluster NF PF Cluster NF PF 
1 177 0.31 33 79 0.16 65 275 0.12 97 802 0.36 
2 211 0.49 34 132 0.28 66 526 0.18 98 73 0.12 
3 984 0.23 35 407 0.42 67 414 0.21 99 15 0.07 
4 247 0.2 36 302 0.19 68 603 0.38 100 37 0.04 
5 543 0.26 37 418 0.3 69 64 0.06 101 141 0.25 
6 458 0.35 38 630 0.21 70 19 0.07 102 442 0.4 
7 126 0.1 39 1180 0.48 71 40 0.07 103 297 0.12 
8 84 0.11 40 60 0.14 72 133 0.05 104 446 0.15 
9 74 0.1 41 21 0.14 73 90 0.1 105 558 0.17 
10 301 0.07 42 48 0.18 74 52 0.22 106 315 0.32 
11 122 0.08 43 67 0.07 75 54 0.27 107 65 0.08 
12 240 0.32 44 45 0.14 76 87 0.18 108 23 0.07 
13 776 0.44 45 43 0.18 77 90 0.26 109 125 0.31 
14 1065 0.28 46 62 0.34 78 77 0.18 110 290 0.47 
15 1689 0.26 47 103 0.11 79 99 0.3 111 132 0.09 
16 3234 0.31 48 218 0.15 80 36 0.17 112 299 0.2 
17 2592 0.55 49 138 0.13 81 31 0.14 113 229 0.2 
18 188 0.16 50 162 0.25 82 29 0.11 114 341 0.41 
19 25 0.16 51 10 0.09 83 87 0.11 115 34 0.09 
20 142 0.17 52 555 0.36 84 55 0.14 116 16 0.12 
21 212 0.1 53 898 0.47 85 94 0.19 117 145 0.32 
22 35 0.08 54 828 0.31 86 175 0.34 118 190 0.32 
23 137 0.2 55 1390 0.38 87 301 0.1 119 182 0.21 
24 321 0.38 56 1714 0.28 88 263 0.19 120 300 0.25 
25 385 0.18 57 3456 0.53 89 444 0.2 121 310 0.17 
26 288 0.19 58 73 0.13 90 412 0.26 122 268 0.43 
27 589 0.18 59 13 0.09 91 69 0.06 123 38 0.12 
28 954 0.34 60 99 0.17 92 120 0.17 124 43 0.17 
29 50 0.09 61 179 0.1 93 279 0.28 125 29 0.14 
30 64 0.13 62 75 0.13 94 188 0.17 126 87 0.09 
31 52 0.08 63 136 0.19 95 294 0.17 127 70 0.09 
32 133 0.06 64 348 0.42 96 362 0.18       
Note: Cluster = Cluster (region-sector) number; NF= Number of foreign firms ; PF=  Proportion of 
foreign (treated firms) 
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Table 4 
Correlation matrix of cluster level variables   
 
 Proportion 
of FDI firm 
 
Average 
wage 
Average 
productivity 
Average 
export 
intensity 
Average 
export 
intensity 
Average 
size 
Average 
age 
Log 
number 
FDI 
firms 
Proportion of  
FDI firms  
1        
Average wage  0.503
***
 1       
Average 
productivity  
0.222
*
 -0.186
*
 1      
Average export 
intensity  
0.657
***
 0.425
***
 -0.145 1     
Share of SOEs  -0.415
***
 0.0968 -0.172 -0.529
***
 1    
Average size  -0.175
*
 0.341
***
 0.0395 -0.348
***
 0.402
***
 1   
Average age  -0.0969 0.404
***
 -0.223
*
 -0.258
**
 0.606
***
 0.486
***
 1  
Log number 
of FDI firms   
0.654
***
 0.147 0.0871 0.736
***
 -0.642
***
 -
0.409
***
 
-
0.312
***
 
1 
Notes:  
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
 
  
32 
 
Appendix A 
 
Geographic classification used in this paper  
AREA PROVINCES Share of 
foreign ownership 
1 Beijing and Tianjin 0.25 
2 Shanghai 0.39 
3 Liaoning and Shandong 0.21 
4 Jiangsu 0.24 
5 Fujian and Zhejiang 0.23 
6 Guangdong and Hainan 0.44 
7 Inner Mongolia, Hebei and Shanxi 0.10 
8 Jilin, Heilongjiang 0.12 
9 Jiangxi, Anhui 0.12 
10 Qinghai, Henan, Gansu, Shaanxi,  Hunan,  
Ningxia, Hubei, Guangxi and Xinjiang 0.08 
11 Guizhou, Yunnan, Sichuan and Chongqing 0.09 
 
Industrial classification used in this paper  
Industry 
group 
Industry name Share  of 
foreign ownership 
1 Food processing 0.16 
1 Food production 0.25 
1 Beverages  0.18 
2 Textiles  0.23 
2 Garments and other fibre products 0.44 
2 Leather, furs, down  related products 0.42 
3 Timber processing 0.20 
3 Furniture manufacturing 0.35 
3 Papermaking and paper products 0.17 
3 Printing and record medium reproduction 0.14 
4 Rubber products 0.26 
4 Plastic products 0.29 
5 Smelting and pressing of ferrous metals 0.11 
5 Smelting and pressing of nonferrous metals 0.16 
6 Electric equipment and machinery 0.25 
6 Electronic and telecommunications 0.54 
6 Instruments and meters  0.36 
6 Other electronic equipment 0.38 
7 Raw chemical materials and chemical products 0.17 
8 Medical and pharmaceutical products 0.19 
9 Non-metal mineral products 0.17 
10 Metal products 0.22 
11 Ordinary machinery 0.18 
12 Special purpose equipment 0.24 
13 Transport equipment 0.19 
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Appendix B 
Summary statistics of estimated coefficients from the first stage cluster-specific 
Logit model (N=127): 
 
Pre-treatment  
covariates 
(in 2004) 
Mean Average 
St. error 
Min Max Proportion  
of clusters 
with 
significant  
coefficients 
   
Proportion 
of clusters 
with 
balanced 
covariates 
Log 
productivity  
.0890319 .1203289 -.2622438 .597029 .2755906 0.976 
Log wages  1.187789 .2782815 -1.787512 2.724028 .8976378 0.984 
Wages growth  -.5439145 .3858767 -8.982675 .4646787 .488189 0.992 
Productivity 
growth  
-.0824834 .1951044 -1.312997 2.76314 .2519685 
0.984 
Exporting 
intensity  
2.701552 .576253 -3.520742 11.78326 .9606299 
0.961 
Size .295387 .0829834 -.1505758 .6941422 .7874016 0.976 
Age -.3614924 .1539911 -.9862373 .1851604 .6692913 0.976 
Log of number 
of foreign firms 
in region 
.4355861 1.043163 -10.30238 23.77369 .6141732 0.835 
Notes: 
1. Estimated coefficients from binary logit models can be interpreted as the effects of the covariates 
on the log odd-ratio of foreign ownership. 
2. The penultimate column gives the proportion of individually statistically significant coefficients at 
10% level or lower. In all cases the coefficients are jointly statistically significant. 
3. The last column gives the results from the covariate balancing test which consists of testing (at 
10% level or lower) for difference in the means of the covariates in treatment and control groups, 
conditional on the estimated propensity score. 
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Appendix C: Calculating treatment effects 
We investigate the existence of causal links between potential outcomes and the 
proportion of treated firms in a cluster. For this purpose, we treat the cluster level average 
potential outcomes ?̅?𝑟
1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ?̅?𝑟
0 as the “outcome” variables and the corresponding proportion 
of foreign-owned firms, 𝑝𝑟 , as the “treatment” variable.  
Since we now have a continuous treatment variable rather than a binary one, we employ 
the causal inference approach for continuous treatments (Hirano and Imbens, 2004; Imai and 
van Dyk, 2004).
17
  A key result from this literature is that causal inference can be conducted 
by conditioning on the generalised propensity score (GPS), which is the conditional density of 
the treatment given some pre-treatment variables. Hence, this can be seen as an extension of 
the conditional independence assumption (CIA) to the case of a continuous treatment 
variable. Since our assumption is that of “no interaction across clusters”, SUTVA holds for 
the cluster level analysis. 
Since the treatment variable is a proportion between 0 and 1, we estimate the determinants 
of treatment using the fractional logit model due to Papke and Wooldridge (1996). In the 
empirical implementation, we condition 𝑝𝑟 on a vector Z of observable pre-treatment cluster 
characteristics which include average wages, productivity, size, age and the proportion of 
exporting, state-owned and the number of foreign owned firms in the region.. The 
econometric estimates and corresponding marginal effects from this fractional logit model, 
and balancing test results are reported in Tables C1 and C2. 
Letting ?̂? be the vector of estimated coefficients from the fractional logit model, the GPS 
conditional on Z and pr can then be obtained as 
                                                                                                                                 (C1) 
 
                                                          
17
 See Du and Girma (2009), and Fryges and Wagner (2008) for international trade applications of GPS 
matching techniques.  
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We then estimate the expected values of each of the two potential outcomes ( ?̅?𝑟
1 and  ?̅?𝑟
0) at 
cluster level conditional on ?̂?𝑟 and 𝑝𝑟. These expected values are unknown and can be 
estimated using a polynomial approximation (Hirano and Imbens, 2004) such as the following 
quadratic form which is often found to be adequate:
 18
 
 
                              
with sample counterpart 
                                                                                                                                             
  In Figure C1, we plot the 95% confidence regions of the two potential outcomes 
?̅?𝑟
1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ?̅?𝑟
0  against 𝑝𝑟 (based on bootstrapped standard errors) over the practically feasible 
range of 0 to 50%
19
.  This clearly shows that the potential outcomes for productivity (for 
treated and untreated firms) vary systematically with the treatment level in the cluster.  Given 
our econometric approach, we can interpret this as a causal relationship, i.e., changes in the 
treatment level per cluster lead to changes in potential outcomes.  This indicates that SUTVA 
does not hold in our analysis. 
The thus calculated potential outcomes for different levels of  𝑝𝑟 are then used to 
calculate the treatment effects described in equations (11) to (14).  
 
Calculating standard errors 
To illustrate how the bootstrapped standard errors are calculated, we take the example 
of estimating the indirect effects of FDI using the formula given in Equation (123). This 
estimator is defined as the change in the potential outcome of non-foreign-owned firms 
resulting from increasing the cluster-specific proportion of foreign firms from 0 to p ∈ {0,1}     
                                                          
18
 Note that the parameters of such parametric approximation do not have any behavioural interpretation (Hirano 
and Imbens, 2004). These are used to obtain an unbiased estimator of the population mean. 
19
 In our data, the proportion of foreign owned firms is less than 50% in 98% of the clusters. 
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  ?̅?𝑝0 
00 = ?̅?𝑝
0 − ?̅?0
0 
The average treatment effect based on our 127 clusters (indexed by c below) is 
naturally estimated as  
  γ̅p0 
00 =  
1
127
∑ ypr
0
127
c=1
− y0r
0  
 
Recall that the ys in the above equation are potential outcomes  based on the inverse 
probability-weighted regression (Equation 15).  The issue here is that standard formula for 
calculation the standard errors of means will be inadequate due the need of accounting for the 
fact  the propensity score are estimated. Accordingly we compute bootstrapped standard 
errors via resampling with replacement. In our practical estimation we implemented 200 
bootstraps (indexed by B below) and used the following formula:  
 s. e( γ̅p0 
00 ) = √
1
200
∑(  γ̅p0,B 
00 −   γ̅B
00)
2
200
B=1
  
with   γ̅B
00 =
1
200
∑   γ̅
p0,B 
00200
B=1  
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Figure C1 
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Table C1: Estimated coefficients and marginal effects from the fractional logit model: 
Dependent variable: proportion of FDI firms in cluster 
  Estimated 
coefficients 
Marginal 
effects 
Wages 1.024*** 0.158*** 
 (0.1660) (0.0258) 
Productivity 0.695*** 0.107*** 
 (0.1155) (0.0181) 
Export intensity 0.985* 0.152* 
 (0.5659) (0.0871) 
SOE share -1.200 -0.186 
 (0.9849) (0.1523) 
Log of number of FDI Firms 0.218*** 0.034*** 
 (0.0496) (0.0077) 
Size -0.242** -0.037** 
 (0.0997) (0.0155) 
Age 0.414 0.064 
 (0.2888) (0.0448) 
Observations 127  
Notes: 
(i) Standard errors are given in parenthesis 
(ii) * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
             
 
Table C2: Balancing tests second stage estimation 
 Covariate 
(pre-treatment period) 
Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4 
Wages 0.30 0.16 0.37 
Productivity 0.29 0.70 0.42 
Export intensity 0.44 0.75 0.92 
SOE share 0.72 0.52 0.93 
Number of FDI firms 0.14 0.05 0.08 
Size 0.55 0.68 0.89 
Age 0.28 0.45 0.45 
 
Note: Since the treatment is continuous we divided the observations into four groups by treatment quartiles and 
conditional on the generalised propensity score, we tested for equality of means of each of the covariates across 
all quartiles (using Quartile 1 as the base group). We did not reject the null hypothesis of equality of means in 
any of the tests whose p-value are reported below. 
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Appendix  D 
Following the very helpful suggestion of a referee, we outline the main reasons why a simple 
linear model where the direct and indirect effects of FDI are estimated within a single 
framework is unlikely to be an adequate empirical tool.  
Suppose we aim to estimate the direct and indirect effects of FDI on an outcome variable y:  
      𝑦𝑖𝑟 = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝛽𝑟
𝑅
𝑟=1 𝑑𝑖𝑟 + 𝛾𝑝𝑟 + 𝛿𝑝𝑟 ∗ 𝑑𝑖𝑟 + 𝜀𝑖𝑟                                  (D1) 
In the above equation r =1. …R indexes clusters and i=1. …. N denotes firms within clusters, 
where for simplicity we assume each cluster has the same number of firms N. 
We define d=1 if the firm is foreign owned, and 0 else. Thus the’s would capture cluster-
specific direct effects of FDI.  𝑝𝑟 =
1
𝑁
∑ 𝑑𝑖𝑟
𝑁
𝑖=1  is the average foreign presence in cluster r. 
Thus 𝛾 would measure FDI spillovers to domestic firms, whereas 𝛾 +  𝛿 would identify FDI 
spillovers to foreign  firms. 
The estimation of this simple yet attractive empirical model is fraught with difficulties, 
however.  Firstly, since there is selection at both firm and cluster level (as argued in the main 
body of this paper), identification would involve estimating two (generalised) propensity 
scores, one at firm level (say 𝑃1𝑖) and one at cluster level (say 𝑃2𝑖). However, to the best our 
knowledge, there is no available estimator which can deal, within a single equation, with two 
propensity-scores estimated at two different levels. So it would not suffice to estimate 
equation [D1] by inverse probability weighted regression, with treated firms getting weight of 
1/p1 and non-treated firms getting weight of 1/1-p1, as we would still have 𝐸(𝜀𝑖𝑟|𝑝𝑟) ≠ 0 
rendering the resulting estimator inconsistent. 
The above problem notwithstanding, the second issue associated with estimating equation 
[D1] has to do with the fact that it does not, unlike the estimation approach advocated in this 
paper, allow for a richer counterfactual analysis. For example the relationship between y and 
𝑝𝑟 is essentially linear restricting spillovers to be a monotonic function of foreign presence.  
40 
 
The third problem with the estimation of equation [D1], especially the inclusion of the term 
capturing FDI spillovers to foreign firms, is a variant of the well-known reflection problem in 
social interaction models (see Manski, 1993).  To be more precise, foreign firm i contributes 
1/N to 𝑝𝑟 (the FDI variable). Consequently it is conceptually difficult to isolate direct from 
indirect effects in this setup, again the problem of dealing with two propensity scores 
estimated at two different levels notwithstanding.  
 
